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I. INTRODUCTION
Hobby Lobby’s statement of purpose proclaims the owners’
commitment to “[h]onoring the Lord in all we do by operating the company
in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.”1 In 2012, Hobby Lobby
filed suit arguing that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) interfered with its
religious rights by requiring corporations to provide funding for employee
insurance plans that cover contraception (ACA Contraception Mandate).2
Other companies rooted in religious ideals also objected to this mandate,
stating it violated their religious freedom.3 However, it was not clear if
corporations had religious rights in the first place.4
The word “corporation” is derived from the Latin word of corpus,
which means body.5 The law has taken the origin of the word corporation to
heart and recognized that a corporation can do many of the same things that
a natural person can do.6 A corporation can bring lawsuits when it is
wronged, buy and sell property, enter into contracts with others, pay taxes,
and commit crimes.7 Corporations also enjoy many of the same rights of a
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natural person, such as freedom of speech under the First Amendment.8
However, corporations do not have the right to vote, which demonstrates that
the entire spectrum of constitutional rights available to a natural person is not
given to corporations.9 It is unknown if constitutional religious freedom
rights will ever be extended to corporations. If corporations do have statutory
religious rights that are being oppressed by the ACA Contraception Mandate,
it is also important to consider the impact on employees who will have the
burden of providing for this healthcare shifted upon them.
As a result of the legal uncertainty concerning corporate religious
rights, the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc. v. Sebelius.10 In light of the Tenth Circuit’s ruling, the Court held in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. that the ACA Contraception Mandate
substantially burdened a corporate person’s exercise of religion in a manner
that is not the least restrictive means possible.11 Therefore, the Court allowed
a for-profit corporation, such as Hobby Lobby, to deny its employees
insurance coverage for contraception to which the employees are otherwise
entitled to under the ACA Contraception Mandate.12 The Court declined to
define the full extent of the religious rights of a corporation under the
Constitution of the United States.13 This Comment will argue that the Court’s
decision to invalidate the ACA Contraception Mandate, in the context of
Burwell, is incorrect because this ruling infringes upon the “religious beliefs”
of natural person employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”). The Court’s holding oppresses the Title VII religious rights of
the natural person, which arise from constitutional protection, while granting
religious protection to corporate persons, who have not been given religious
constitutional protection by the Court.
This Comment will evaluate the impact of a religious corporation’s
claim against the ACA Contraception Mandate. The Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc. line of cases presents a conflict between the religious rights of the
corporate person and the employment rights of natural persons. Because of
the constitutional avoidance substantive canon, it is likely that the Court
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Ct. App. 1970) (corporation sued for specific performance of a contract for land); State v.
Adjustment Dep’t Credit Bureau, Inc., 483 P.2d 687, 688 (Idaho 1971) (corporation was charged
with extortion).
See Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method
of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 98 (2005).
Id. at 95–100.
See generally Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013); cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 678 (2013), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780-81 (2014).
Id. at 2785.
See id.; see also John Bursch, Hobby Lobby and Conestoga: The Most Difficult-to-Answer
Question, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 21, 2014, 10:54 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/
symposium-hobby-lobby-and-conestoga-the-most-difficult-to-answer -question/.
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chose not to resolve the ACA Contraception Mandate issue by declaring that
corporations have First Amendment religious rights.14 The Court resolved
the issue in Burwell under federal law, which rendered the ACA
Contraception Mandate invalid because the burden it placed on religious
corporations was not narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling government
interest.15 However, even if the Court had held that the ACA Contraception
Mandate was valid, the ACA could exempt a company like Hobby Lobby
from paying the ACA Contraception Mandate, which would still shift the
burden of providing contraception to the employee. This will generate valid
claims against the employer from the burdened employees. In Part II, this
Comment will first examine the background of the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment to evaluate the constitutional rights of the corporate
person. Second, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) will be
examined as a statutory basis for a claim of religious discrimination against
a corporation. Additionally, Part II, as well as Part III, will evaluate the
seminal cases of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Burwell that demonstrate the
extent of a corporation’s religious rights. Once the rights of the corporate
person are analyzed, Part IV will explore the personal rights of the individual
employee that are oppressed in the context of Title VII, which is the basis for
why this Comment argues the Court’s holding in Burwell is incorrect.
Finally, Part V will attempt to offer solutions to resolve the issues
surrounding the ACA Contraception Mandate.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of Corporate Constitutional Rights
Over the past two hundred years, the corporation has evolved from a
seldom-used method of doing business to one of the more powerful and
influential social organizations.16 The rights of the modern-day corporation
are very different and much more extensive than the rights possessed by
corporations in the early years of the United States.17 During colonial times,
corporations were legal entities of the states and had rights to the extent that
they were granted by the state.18 Most businesses that existed during this
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Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2785.
Id. at 2780.
Krannich, supra note 8, at 61.
Id. at 64–65.
See id. at 64; Jess Bravin, Sotomayor Issues Challenge to a Century of Corporate Law, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 17, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125314088285517643.html (“For
centuries, corporations have been considered beings apart from their human owners, yet sharing
with them some attributes, such as the right to make contracts and own property.”); Trs. of
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 635 (1819) (“A corporation is an artificial being,
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time were partnerships and sole proprietorships.19 The few corporations that
existed were created by the states to serve a specific public purpose.20 The
limited corporations are in stark contrast to modern corporations, which are
the “preeminent economic actors in our society, operating largely in
conformity with their own bylaws, rather than at the whim of the state.”21
“Many commentators believe that the modern business corporation is such a
powerful, pervasive entity that it should be viewed as a quasi-governmental
body.”22
New rights enjoyed by today’s corporations arose suddenly out of Santa
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad and Pembina Consolidated
Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania.23 The Court in Santa Clara County
casually declared, “The court does not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion
that it does.”24 This simple statement that lacked further justification or
analysis gave birth to the legal fiction that a corporation is a “person” who is
entitled to constitutional rights and protection.25 Additionally, decisions that
stem from the Santa Clara County holding also lack a definitive explanation
for why a corporation is a “person” entitled to Fourteenth Amendment
protection.26
However, the first legally recognized corporate constitutional rights did
not originate from the First Amendment, but rather the Equal Protection
Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.27
Interestingly, the Court in Pembina Consolidated Mining & Milling Co.
declined to acknowledge a corporation as a “citizen” entitled to Privileges
and Immunities Clause protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.28
The Court also extended the constitutional protection of the Fourth
Amendment to corporations.29 In Hale v. Henkel, the Court held that
corporations should be protected from unreasonable search and seizure under
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invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it.”).
Krannich, supra note 8, at 61; Spadaccini, supra note 5 (“The sole proprietorship is not a legal
entity. It simply refers to a natural person who owns the business and is personally responsible for
its debts . . . A partnership is a business form created automatically when two or more persons
engage in a business enterprise for profit.”).
Krannich, supra note 8, at 64.
Id.
Id. at 65.
Bravin, supra note 18.
Id.; see Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 394 (1886).
Bravin, supra note 18.
Krannich, supra note 8, at 95.
Id. at 94.
Pembina Consol. Mining and Milling v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 187 (1888).
Krannich, supra note 8, at 96–97.
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the Fourth Amendment.30 However, in Hale, the Court also decided that
corporations did not have a right of protection against self-incrimination
under the Fifth Amendment.31 The extent of corporate rights under the Fifth
Amendment are muddled by the fact that the Court has consistently held that
corporations are entitled to Fifth Amendment double jeopardy protection, but
corporations are not granted self-incrimination protection.32 Despite the fact
that the use of the term “persons” appears in the same context in both clauses,
the Court has not explained why a corporation is a “person” for purposes of
double jeopardy, but not for purposes of self-incrimination.33 Again, the
discrepancy regarding Fifth Amendment protection demonstrates that the
corporate “person” is not entitled to all constitutional rights that a natural
United States citizen possesses.34
Recently, the Court has also extended First Amendment protection to
corporations.35 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen’s
Consumer Council, the Court held that commercial speech, which is
recognized as a general form of communication, is protected by the First
Amendment.36 Since the decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the
Court has limited the scope of constitutional protection for corporate
speech.37 The fear of the Court is that protecting the free speech of powerful
corporations may “dilute the marketplace of ideas.”38 This fear is particularly
relevant in the political arena.39 In Federal Election Commission v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the Court struck down a federal law
prohibiting for-profit and non-profit corporate spending linked to federal
elections.40 However, the Court noted that the law might have been
constitutional if designed to combat the “corrosive influence of concentrated
corporate wealth,” but the law was invalid because non-profit corporations
did not pose the same threat to political speech.41 Complete freedom of
speech rights have not been granted to corporations because the Court wants
to create a balance between freedom of speech, and not allowing powerful
corporations to drown out all other points of view.42
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Va. State Bd. of Pharm v. Va. Citizen’s Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
Krannich, supra note 8, at 98-99.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 98–99.
See Fed. Election Com’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263–65 (1986).
Id. at 257.
Krannich, supra note 8, at 100.
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The history of constitutional protection for corporations is dynamic and
continuing to evolve.43 Corporations are not entitled to all of the
constitutional rights that a natural “person” is entitled to, specifically in the
context of the First Amendment.44 It remains to be seen if First Amendment
religious protection will ever be granted to the corporate “person.”
Corporate religious protection would come from the Free Exercise Clause
within the First Amendment, which states, “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.”45 It is established law that associations, and not just individuals,
have Free Exercise religious rights.46 To explain why associations are also
protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court has stated, “[a]n individual's
freedom . . . to worship . . . could not be vigorously protected from
interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group
effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.”47 For this reason, the
Tenth Circuit extended Free Exercise rights to associations in Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., and, more specifically, to corporations.48
B. Explanation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
The RFRA was enacted to bolster the commitment that the Framers of
the Constitution had to the free exercise of religion.49 Religion is an
“unalienable right” that is guaranteed to all people and should be free from
government interference.50 The RFRA recognizes the fact that religious laws
that are either intentionally suppressive, or neutral, may impede on the free
exercise of religion.51 The Court’s ruling in Employment Division
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith is an example of a
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See generally id.
Id. at 95–100.
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1133.
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1133. (“First Amendment protection extends to corporations
. . . [, and the Court] has thus rejected the argument that . . . corporations or other associations should
be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not natural
persons.”).
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
Id. Congress found that,
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an
unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution; (2)
laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended
to interfere with religious exercise; (3) governments should not substantially burden
religious exercise without compelling justification.
Id.
Id.
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neutral law hindering the free exercise of religion.52 In that case, petitioners
sought review of an employment law ruling that classified the petitioners’
religious use of peyote as “misconduct.”53 The penalty for such
“misconduct” disqualified the petitioners from receiving Oregon
unemployment compensation benefits.54 The Court held that sacramental
peyote use violated state drug laws, so prohibiting the use of the peyote was
not in conflict with the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause.55 Oregon
was permitted to regulate ceremonial peyote use and deny petitioners their
unemployment benefits based on the “misconduct” of testing positive for
peyote.56 The ruling in Smith allowed for neutral state laws to interfere with
the free exercise of religion, which prompted Congress to enact the RFRA.57
“[G]overnments should not substantially burden religious exercise without
compelling justification.”58 The RFRA provides an additional cause of
action or affirmative defense, besides the First Amendment, for individuals
who have had their religious rights substantially burdened by a state or
federal law.59
C. ACA Contraception Mandate Litigation
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Burwell are paramount cases when
analyzing the balance of corporate religious rights within the context of the
ACA Contraception Mandate.60 There were other ACA Contraception
Mandate cases before the Court, but the facts and arguments of Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. encompass these other cases.61 The basic argument was that
religious for-profit companies felt that they should not have to provide for
employee insurance under the ACA Contraception Mandate because it was a
violation of their religious freedom.62
The plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. were David and Barbra
Green, who, along with their three children, are the owners and operators of
52.
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See generally Emp’t Div. Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 874.
Id.
Id. at 890.
Id.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
Id. § 2000bb(a)(3) (“[T]he compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior
governmental interests.”).
Id. § 2000bb(a)(2).
See generally Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 678 (2013), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2751 (2014).
See generally Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv.,
724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013).
Marty Lederman, Symposium: How to Understand Hobby Lobby, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 23, 2014,
7:20 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/symposium-how-to-understand-hobby-lobby/.
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Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Mardel, Inc.63 The Green family founded
Hobby Lobby, which is an arts and crafts chain.64 Hobby Lobby is an Scorporation65 and is comprised of over five hundred stores and approximately
thirteen thousand full-time employees.66 The Greens also founded Mardel,
an affiliated chain of thirty-five Christian bookstores with approximately
four hundred full-time employees.67 Both companies are family run on a forprofit basis.68 Furthermore, the Greens make business decisions for both
Hobby Lobby and Mardel with religious faith as an important
consideration.69
Hobby Lobby is organized within a religious framework.70 Hobby
Lobby’s statement of purpose proclaims that one of the company’s objectives
is to maintain a commitment to “[h]onoring the Lord in all we do by operating
the company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.”71 Mardel
shares a similar commitment to religious principles in its own business
statement of purpose.72 Examples of corporate decisions based on faith
include closing Hobby Lobby and Mardel stores on Sundays and not
allowing business activities that advertise alcohol.73
Additionally, the Greens finance the operation of Hobby Lobby and
Mardel through the use of a management trust, which mandates that trust
funds for business activities be used in a way that promotes the corporations’
commitment to faith.74 One such religious ideal that Hobby Lobby and
Mardel seek to promote is the belief that human life begins when sperm
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65.
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71.
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Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1122.
Id.
S Corporations, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/SCorporations (last updated Jan. 15, 2015)
S corporations are corporations that elect to pass corporate income, losses, deductions,
and credits through to their shareholders for federal tax purposes. Shareholders of S
corporations report the flow-through of income and losses on their personal tax returns
and are assessed tax at their individual income tax rates. This allows S corporations to
avoid double taxation on the corporate income. S corporations are responsible for tax
on certain built-in gains and passive income at the entity level.
Id.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1122.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (“Similarly, Mardel, which sells exclusively Christian books and materials, describes itself as ‘a
faith-based company dedicated to renewing minds and transforming lives through the products we
sell and the ministries we support.’”).
Id. (“Hobby Lobby buys hundreds of full-page newspaper ads inviting people to ‘know Jesus as
Lord and Savior.’”).
Id. (“The trustees must sign ‘a Trust Commitment,’ which among other things requires them to
affirm the Green family statement of faith and to ‘regularly seek to maintain a close intimate walk
with the Lord Jesus Christ by regularly investing time in His Word and prayer.’”).
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fertilizes an egg and that it is immoral to cause the death of a human
embryo.75
D. Analysis of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th
Cir. 2013)
The Tenth Circuit underwent a highly subjective analysis of the
business structure and company philosophy of Hobby Lobby and Mardel to
determine that the plaintiffs’ businesses had legitimate religious convictions
that could potentially be violated.76 The court acknowledged that not every
company would qualify as a religious company in order to bring a claim
against the ACA Contraception Mandate.77 The following analysis was done
by the Tenth Circuit in the context that the plaintiff was a religious business.78
In order to maintain their corporate religious convictions, the plaintiffs
sought relief from required employer compliance with sections of the ACA
that obligated companies to provide insurance that pays for “preventive care
and screenings” for women.79 The ACA does not specifically state what
“preventive care and screening” healthcare services women are entitled to
under the ACA.80
However, the Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA), which is a Health and Human Services Agency
(HHS) authorized by the ACA to promulgate regulations, has declared that
contraception for women is within the intended scope of “preventive care and
screenings.”81 To comply with the ACA, employers must provide insurance
that pays for contraception methods approved by the Food and Drug
Administration.82 The approved contraception methods include intrauterine

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

82.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1120.
Id. at 1128.
Id. at 1122 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)).
Id. at 1123 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)).
Id.; see also The Public Health and Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012) (“[W]ith
respect to women, such additional preventive care and screenings not described in paragraph (1) as
provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services
Administration for purposes of this paragraph.”).
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1123; Group Health Plans and Health Issuers Relating to
Coverage of Preventative Services, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pt. 147). The regulation provides,
These preventive health services include, with respect to women, preventive care and
screening provided for in the comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) that were issued on August 1, 2011
(HRSA Guidelines). As relevant here, the HRSA Guidelines require coverage, without
cost sharing, for ‘[a]ll Food and Drug Administration [(FDA)] approved contraception
methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women
with reproductive capacity.’
Id.
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devices and emergency contraception that is referred to as Plan B and Ella.83
These methods prevent pregnancy by interfering with the implantation of a
fertilized egg.84 The plaintiffs asserted that funding any activity that
interferes with a fertilized egg is a violation of their corporate religious
beliefs.85 HRSA has allowed exemptions for certain employers, mostly
religious non-profit organizations, from the requirement that they must
provide insurance that pays for contraception.86 However, the plaintiffs were
not covered by any HRSA regulations that would exempt them from the ACA
Contraception Mandate.87
The plaintiffs’ cause of action arose under the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment and the RFRA.88 “A plaintiff makes a prima facie case
under RFRA by showing that the government substantially burdens a sincere
religious exercise.”89 If this is accomplished, the burden of proof shifts to the
government to show that a “compelling” government interest is
accomplished through the application of the scrutinized law to the individual
“person.”90 The RFRA states that the “Government shall not substantially
burden a person’s exercise of religion.”91
The Tenth Circuit held that, for the purposes of the RFRA, the
plaintiffs’ corporations were defined as “persons.”92 The court looked to the
text of the RFRA to support its decision.93 While the text of the RFRA does
not define “person,” the Dictionary Act does offer a definition of “person.”94
The Dictionary Act states “[T]he meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the
context indicates otherwise . . . ‘person’ . . . include[s] ‘corporations’,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock
companies, as well as individuals.”95 The Court has also agreed with this
interpretation of the word “person” in the context of the RFRA.96 However,
the Tenth Circuit felt that there was a possibility that the Dictionary Act did
not address the distinction between for-profit and non-profit corporations.97
To ensure that the RFRA applies to for-profit corporations, such as the

83.
84.
85.
86.
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89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1123.
Id.
Id. at 1125.
Id. at 1123–24.
Id. at 1124.
Id. at 1125.
Id. at 1125–26.
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1128 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 1128–29.
Id. at 1129.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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plaintiffs, the court turned to existing corporate statutes to assist in their
construction of “person.”98
The court looked at other corporate statutes because, if the “context”
offers a different construction of “person” than the Dictionary Act, then the
context definition of “person” would be applied.99 Statutes that are in
“context” contain exemptions for religious employers, which include Title
VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the National Labor Relations
Act.100 The court reasoned that the text of these statutes did not provide
support for the exclusion of a for-profit corporation from the RFRA, but
instead showed that Congress knew how to draft a corporate religious
exclusion.101 The court reasoned that Congress intentionally chose not to
include a corporate religious exclusion into the RFRA.102 For example, in
Title VII, “the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of religion does not
apply to an employer that is ‘a religious corporation, association, educational
institution, or society.’”103 The court concluded that in this “context,” if a
corporate religious exclusion for a for-profit company was not present, then
it did not apply.104 The court also evaluated case law that did not exclude
for-profit companies from the scope of the definition of “person” in the
RFRA.105 The court concluded that there was no persuasive authority that
indicated that Congress meant “person” in the RFRA to have a different
definition than the default definition found in the Dictionary Act, which
includes all corporations within the scope of the meaning of “person.”106
Once the court determined that a “person” under the RFRA could be a
for-profit corporation, it still had to decide if the ACA Contraception
Mandate constituted a substantial burden upon the corporation because of its
religious convictions.107 The court examined whether a substantial burden
was present by weighing three factors, which are if the government legal
obligation “(1) ‘requires participation in an activity prohibited by a sincerely
held religious belief,’ (2) “prevents participation in conduct motivated by a
sincerely held religious belief,” or (3) ‘places substantial pressure . . . to
engage in conduct contrary to a sincerely held religious belief.’”108

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 1130.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1131–32.
Id. at 1132.
Id. at 1137.
Id. at 1138; see generally Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying the
RFRA balancing test when Madyun Abdulhaseeb, a Muslim prisoner, raised a religious objection
to the lack of halal dietary options available in his prison).
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The court first identified the religious beliefs of the plaintiffs.109 The
plaintiffs argued that under the ACA Contraception Mandate they must
provide insurance coverage that provides for contraception that interferes
with a fertilized egg, which is against their religious beliefs.110 Second, the
court determined if this corporate belief was sincere. In this case, a subjective
analysis of the plaintiffs’ corporations convinced the court that the belief was
sincere.111 Third, the court determined if the burden placed on the plaintiff
by the government was substantial.112 The court reasoned that the noncompliance fines that the plaintiffs would be subjected to if they did not
provide the contraception insurance to their employees would constitute a
substantial burden.113 The court held that there was a substantial burden upon
the plaintiffs because of the ACA Contraception Mandate.114
The final issue the court addressed was whether the government had a
compelling interest that was exercised in the least restrictive manner
possible.115 The government interests asserted by the ACA Contraception
Mandate are public health and gender equality.116 The court reasoned that
the interests were not compelling for two reasons.117 The first reason was
that the interests were too broad.118 Second, the interests were not compelling
because the contraception insurance requirement did not apply to the
population as a whole, so portraying the ACA Contraception Mandate as
widespread societal aid was not convincing to the court.119 Even if the

109. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1140 (“The corporate plaintiffs believe life begins at
conception. Thus, they have what they describe as ‘a sincere religious objection to providing
coverage for Plan B and Ella since they believe those drugs could prevent a human embryo . . . from
implanting in the wall of the uterus, causing the death of the embryo.’”).
110. Id. (“The government does not dispute the corporations’ sincerity, and we see no reason to question
it either.”).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1140–41.
113. Id. (“Here, it is difficult to characterize the pressure as anything but substantial. To the extent
Hobby Lobby and Mardel provide a health plan, they would be fined $100 per employee, per
day . . . With over 13,000 employees, that comes to more than $1.3 million per day, or close to $475
million per year. And if Hobby Lobby and Mardel simply stop offering a health plan—dropping
health insurance for more than 13,000 employees—then the companies must pay about $26 million
per year.”). See also Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1) (2012) (“The amount of the
tax imposed by subsection (a) on any failure shall be $100 for each day in the noncompliance period
with respect to each individual to whom such failure relates.”).
114. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1142.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1143.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1143–44.
Second, the interest here cannot be compelling because the contraceptive-coverage
requirement presently does not apply to tens of millions of people. As noted above, this
exempted population includes those working for private employers with grandfathered
plans, for employers with fewer than fifty employees, and, under a proposed rule, for
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government had presented compelling interests, these interests were not
narrowly tailored in the court’s opinion.120 There are other contraception
methods that the plaintiffs must provide insurance for under the ACA
Contraception Mandate that do not involve interference with a fertilized
egg.121 The plaintiffs did not oppose providing insurance for these
methods.122 Rather, the plaintiffs did not want to provide insurance coverage
for the methods that interfere with a fertilized egg.123 The court felt that
allowing for this exemption would not frustrate the goal of providing
preventative care for women under the ACA.124 As it was written, the court
felt the ACA Contraception Mandate was too broad.125
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. was granted certiorari by the Supreme
Court.126 Oral argument before the Court was made in the combined cases
of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. on
March 25, 2014.127 During oral argument, the Justices voiced concern over
the fact that either the healthcare rights of female employees or the religious
rights of companies would be oppressed by the decision.128 However, Justice
Antonin Scalia pointed out that the RFRA does not provide for third party
rights, such as those of the female workers.129 Justices Elena Kagan and
Sonia Sotomayor also pointed out that finding in favor of Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. could create a “slippery slope” that could provide the framework
for companies to continually challenge and unravel the entirety of the
ACA.130 A final important question came from Justice Anthony M. Kennedy,
who inquired as to how the Court could avoid the First Amendment issue of

colleges and universities run by religious institutions . . . they would leave unprotected
all women who work for exempted business entities.
Id.
120. Id. at 1144.
121. Id. (“Hobby Lobby and Mardel ask only to be excused from covering four contraceptive methods
out of twenty, not to be excused from covering contraception altogether. The government does not
articulate why accommodating such a limited request fundamentally frustrates its goals.”).
122. Id. at 1125.
123. Id. at 1143–44.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See generally Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013); cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 678 (2013), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
127. Lyle Denniston, Argument Recap: One Hearing, Two Dramas, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 25, 2014, 4:50
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/argument-recap-one-hearing-two-dramas/.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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the ACA Contraception Mandate’s impact on the right of a corporation to
exercise religion.131 The Court issued its opinion on June 30, 2014.132
The Court’s opinion in Burwell has a profound impact on the rights of
religious corporations, like Hobby Lobby, and their employees. Following
much of the same analysis as the Tenth Circuit, the Court held that the
plaintiffs prevailed under their RFRA claim and that the ACA Contraception
Mandate was invalid.133 However, to reach this conclusion, the Court did not
extend the right of constitutional religious protection to the corporate person
under the Free Exercise Clause.134 This opinion does not overrule the Tenth
Circuit’s holding that that religious corporations are entitled to constitutional
religious protection because the Court likely used the substantive canon of
constitutional avoidance to not rule on the issue.135 The constitutional
avoidance canon provides that “The Court will not pass [rule] upon a
constitutional question . . . if there is also present some other ground upon
which the case may be disposed of.”136 In Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., there
was both a constitutional question, which was whether corporations have
protectable First Amendment religious rights, and also the “other ground” of
the RFRA upon which to resolve the case.
The Court agreed with the extensive statutory construction done by the
Tenth Circuit and concluded that a for-profit corporation is a “person” who
may bring a claim for religious discrimination under the RFRA.137 However,
the Court stated that the applicability of this decision to for-profit
corporations is narrow because it only applies to for-profit corporations with
“sincere religious beliefs.”138 Despite providing important means of
contraception to female employees, the Court felt the ACA Contraception
Mandate imposed a substantial burden upon the religious corporation,
because it forced employers to pay for methods of contraception that were
contrary to the religious beliefs of the plaintiffs.139 Additionally, the Court
chose not to preserve the ACA Contraception Mandate on the grounds that it
was narrowly tailored towards serving a compelling government interest.140
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

139.
140.

Id.
See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
Id. at 2785.
Id.
Id.
JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 269 (Robert C.
Clark et al. eds., 2010).
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2768–69; see also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1132.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2775; see also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 at F.3d 1122 (detailed subjective
analysis by the Tenth Circuit in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. shows that a limited number of companies
can bring a religious claim against the ACA Contraception Mandate. It seems that the Tenth Circuit
was looking for written statements and company practices to determine if there was a legitimate
corporate religious interest).
Burwell, 132 S. Ct. at 2775–79.
Id. at 2780.
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The Court felt that the government has other means of providing the lost
benefit to female employees under the ACA Contraception Mandate without
burdening their religious employers by violating their religious rights under
the RFRA.141 This reasoning shifts the cost of contraception to an undefined
third party and forces female employees to seek contraception coverage
outside of their employer provided group health plan.142
Besides the corporations that may be exempt from the ACA
Contraception Mandate under the rules articulated by the Court in Burwell,
the HSRA may establish exemptions for “religious employers” who do not
have to provide the disputed contraception insurance.143 Therefore, the scope
of the term “religious employers” is in flux, and could eventually encompass
more employers than the narrow ruling in Burwell. The Dissent of Burwell
recognized that this trend imposes a substantial burden upon women because
“[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life
of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive
lives.”144 The invalidation of the ACA Contraception Mandate in Burwell
overrides significant interests of the corporations’ employees and denies
access to contraception coverage otherwise provided by the ACA to women
who do not hold their employers’ beliefs.145
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court’s holding in Burwell will likely have a negative downstream
impact on female employees. Not only is an important method of
contraception now unavailable to female employees of corporations like
Hobby Lobby, but the Court has also allowed these corporations to impose
their own moral choice upon their employees. The Court’s decision to
invalidate the ACA Contraception Mandate, in the context of Burwell, is
incorrect because this ruling infringes upon the “religious beliefs” of natural
person employees under Title VII. The Court’s holding oppresses the Title
VII religious rights of the natural person, which arise from constitutional
protections, while granting religious protection to corporate persons, who
have not been given religious constitutional protection by the Court.
A. Employee Religious Rights Under Title VII
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Burwell bring up an interesting employee
rights issue that was not explored in-depth by the Tenth Circuit or the
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 2780–82.
Id.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1123-24.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2790.
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Supreme Court but was addressed in oral arguments before the Court.146 The
issue is that religious corporations suppress employees’ religious rights when
the company decides for the employees that certain forms of contraception
are immoral and should not be provided in a group health plan. The Tenth
Circuit stated, “Finally, we note a concern raised both at oral argument and
in the government’s briefing that Hobby Lobby and Mardel are, in effect,
imposing their religious views on their employees or otherwise burdening
their employees’ religious beliefs.”147 This is an issue that has widespread
relevance in ACA cases where the employer opposes a mandate under the
ACA or when a company is granted an exemption by the HSRA. The burden
of cost is then shifted to the employees, who have had their own rights
oppressed. This issue will be explored in the context of Title VII.
Title VII is a paramount statute that must be considered when
evaluating possible oppression of employee rights.148 The overall purpose of
Title VII is to forbid an employer from discriminating against an employee
on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.149 Title VII also
requires that employers reasonably accommodate employees’ sincerely held
religious practices, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the employer’s business.150 The overall theme of Title VII is
that employees have certain rights that cannot be denied to them by their
employers.151
The exercise of corporate religious rights has the potential to deny
employee rights under Title VII. Enforcement of employee rights falls to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which is the agency
that is delegated authority to enforce Title VII against non-compliant
employers.152 EEOC Guidance materials indicate that Title VII’s prohibition
against disparate treatment of employees based on religion is broad and can
be applied to a variety of circumstances.153 EEOC Regulations also set a
broad scope for what may constitute a religious belief, practice, or
observance.154 This broad scope is consistently applied in EEOC Regulation
violation suits by courts that need to determine if a religious interest is at

146. Denniston, supra note 127.
147. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1144–45 (“Accommodations for religion frequently operate
by lifting a burden from the accommodated party and placing it elsewhere.”).
148. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1-17) (2012).
149. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, EEOC (2014), http://www.eeoc.gov.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (“Power of Commission to prevent unlawful employment practices. The
Commission is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any
unlawful employment practice as set forth in section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title [section 703
or 704].”).
153. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra note 149.
154. Guidelines and Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2001).
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stake.155 EEOC Regulations state, “[i]n most cases whether or not a practice
or belief is religious is not at issue. However, in those cases in which the
issue does exist, the Commission will define religious practices to include
moral or ethical beliefs . . . .”156 Title VII protects the religious beliefs, or
lack thereof, of employees when employers are exercising control over their
employees.157
This is relevant to the Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Burwell litigation
because the plaintiffs sought to deny employees their right to contraception
coverage under the ADA.158 While wanting contraception healthcare is
obviously not a traditional “religious belief,” it is likely that the scope of Title
VII is broad enough to cover this encroachment upon employee rights.159 If
an employee decides that birth control is a preventative measure that the
woman would like to take, this entails a moral decision by the woman.160 As
stated in the EEOC Regulations, moral beliefs are protected from employer
infringement under Title VII.161 In Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Burwell,
the employer decided that providing contraception coverage for employees
was morally wrong, even though some female employees do not have a moral
objection to the contraception.162 This is a violation of Title VII because an
employer has denied employees a right that is entitled to employees under
the ACA because of corporate religious beliefs.163 Specifically, Title VII
Prohibited Practices outlines several benefits that cannot be denied by
employers on the basis of religion.164 Among the benefits that cannot be
denied are insurance benefits.165 The plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
and Burwell showed no regard for the contrary moral or religious beliefs of
their employees.
155. Id.
156. Id.; see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185–86 (1965).
[T]he statutory definition excepts those registrants whose beliefs are based on a ‘merely
personal moral code’ . . . We have construed the statutory definition broadly and it
follows that any exception to it must be interpreted narrowly. The use by Congress of
the words ‘merely personal’ seems to us to restrict the exception to a moral code which
is not only personal but which is the sole basis for the registrant’s belief and is in no way
related to a Supreme Being. It follows, therefore, that if the claimed religious beliefs of
the respective registrants in these cases meet the test that we lay down then their
objections cannot be based on a ‘merely personal’ moral code.
Id. See generally Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
157. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1-17) (2012).
158. See generally Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 678 (2013), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2751 (2014).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1-17).
160. Id.
161. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1.
162. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1122; Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2755.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1-17).
164. Id.
165. Id.
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B. Title VII Case Law Supports an Employee’s Claim in the Context of
Hobby Lobby Stores
The issue of whether an employer needs to provide insurance for
contraception is not a new issue and has been litigated in the past. In Willett
v. Emory and Henry College, the court evaluated whether an employee could
recover under Title VII if the employee was discriminatorily denied benefits
under the employer’s group health plan.166 Pursuant to the terms of the
female employee’s employment contract with her employer, “the plaintiff
was eligible to participate in a group health insurance plan, which provided
dependent benefits to the spouses and children of employees.”167 The policy
included benefit payments for surgical treatment for pregnancy and related
disabilities.168 The plaintiff enrolled in the group health plan and was denied
coverage after a surgery that required pregnancy insurance benefits.169 The
court found the benefits had not been denied to the employee based on her
pregnancy and gender, but rather because the plaintiff was not in full
compliance with the terms of the group health plan.170 For this reason, the
court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to Title VII relief.171 The opinion
seems to indicate that the case may have been more favorable to the plaintiff
under Title VII if the plaintiff had been in compliance with her health plan,
similar to employees in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., and the benefits were still
denied.172
A similar issue was considered under Title VII in EEOC v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., the plaintiff was a United Parcel Service (UPS)
employee.173 He was denied coverage for his wife’s prescription for an oral
contraception.174 The plaintiff’s wife was prescribed the oral contraception
to treat an incapacitating female hormonal disorder.175 The health plan
benefits of UPS excluded coverage of oral contraception for all purposes,
including treatment of female hormonal disorders.176
As a result, the EEOC brought suit and alleged that UPS engaged in
unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII by providing a health

166. See Willett v. Emory & Henry Coll., 427 F. Supp. 631, 633 (W.D. Vir. 1977).
167. Id at 632 (“The applicable provision is set forth below: Pregnancy Expense Benefits . . . are available
to you if you are a female Employee, or to your wife if you are a male Employee, and if you are
insured with respect to your Dependents.”).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id at 636.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1217 (D. Minn. 2001).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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benefit plan that discriminated against its employees because of their sex.177
According to the EEOC, UPS discriminated against female employees by
refusing to provide them with coverage for hormonal treatment while male
employees were eligible to receive coverage for hormonal treatment.178
Additionally, the EEOC argued that UPS discriminated against male
employees because UPS failed to provide the spouses of male employees
with the same coverage that it provided to spouses of female employees who
were entitled to the hormonal coverage.179 UPS asserted that the exclusion
was gender neutral, because neither female employees nor spouses of male
employees were covered for oral contraception.180 The EEOC also argued
that UPS’s exclusion of coverage for prescription contraception had a
disparate impact on females because of their sex.181 The court held that Title
VII prohibits employers from engaging in employment practices that are
facially neutral but are discriminatory in operation.182 The court determined
that even if UPS’s plan was unlawful, it had a disparate impact on women
because only women could benefit from the treatment.183 The court
considered UPS’s argument that its benefits coverage negated the claim
because both female employees and spouses of male employees were not
covered under the insurance exclusion of oral contraception.184 The court
considered the argument that because only females can be prescribed the oral
contraception, the facially neutral exclusion was harsher on female
employees.185 The court held that the EEOC sufficiently pled a disparate
impact claim based on the above arguments and allegations.186
The court addressed a similar issue in In re Union Pacific Railroad
Employment Practices. The defendant, Union Pacific, provided healthcare
benefits to its employees who were covered by collective bargaining
agreements.187 The plans excluded all types of both male and female
contraception methods when the contraception was used for the sole purpose
of contraception.188 Union Pacific only covered contraception when
medically necessary for a non-contraception purpose, such as regulating

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1219–20 (“To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, a plaintiff must show that an
employer uses ‘employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups
but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another without justification.’”).
Id. at 1220.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp’t Practices, 479 F.3d 936, 938 (8th Cir. 2007).
Id.
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menstrual cycles.189 The plaintiff female employees brought suit against
Union Pacific alleging that the defendants discriminated against its female
employees by not providing coverage of prescription contraception in
violation of Title VII.190 Union Pacific argued that a requirement to cover
prescription contraception would have a large financial impact; that the
denial of all contraception results in equal treatment of men and women; that
contraception deals with fertility and is not a medical condition “related to”
pregnancy; that Union Pacific’s covered benefits are treatment-related, not
preventive; and that there was no medical need for contraception regarding
fertility because pregnancy is a normal human condition.191 The court
compared the scope of the applicable health benefit to men and women in the
context of denying contraception coverage.192 The court held that there was
no violation of Title VII because both men and women were denied
contraception.193 In the court’s Title VII analysis, the question of disparate
costs to men and women during pregnancy was not addressed.194 The
common theme of the above Title VII cases is that when a company denies
specific treatment insurance coverage to a particular class of employees, such
as females, a valid Title VII claim may arise.
C. Employee Recourse Under Title VII
Overall, the Title VII caselaw shows that a legitimate claim can be made
against an employer when contraception is denied to the employees as part
of a health insurance benefits plan. It seems likely that invalidating the ACA
Contraception Mandate could constitute a Title VII violation. Title VII was
enacted to protect the rights of the individual employee in the face of various
forms of discrimination. The denial of contraception coverage is an
infringement upon an employee’s protected Title VII religious belief. Since
EEOC Regulations set a broad scope for what a “religious belief” actually
means in a practical sense, it is likely that choosing to use contraception
constitutes a moral decision. EEOC caselaw has held that the employee may
regard a religious right as any moral choice. Lack of religious conviction
also constitutes a “religious belief.” Therefore, the choice to take
contraception comes down to a moral choice. The woman can either decide
that it is not a conflict with her personal religious beliefs to use contraception;
the woman could believe in a religion that is not at odds with contraception
in the first place; or the woman could actively not believe in religion at all,
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 939.
Id. at 944–45.
Id.
See generally id.
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which would make any religious conflict regarding contraception moot.
Regardless, using contraception involves a moral choice of some kind. This
is not unlike using any other sort of medicine. For example, some groups of
people believe that manmade medicine should not be used.195 This is a
religious or moral choice. A person who chooses to use medicine is making
a decision not to comply with the beliefs of the non-medicine using group.
The belief still prompted the person to act in a certain way, which constitutes
a moral choice. The Court’s holding in Burwell infringes upon the Title VII
religious rights of the natural person, which arise from established First
Amendment religious protection, in order to protect the religious rights of a
corporation. This is an incorrect application of law because the Court has
never held that a corporation has constitutional religious rights. As it stands
now, the Court is left with a conflict between the laws of Title VII and the
RFRA.
Invalidating the ACA Contraception Mandate also imposes a disparate
negative impact on female employees. Only women will be denied the
benefit of emergency contraception that their fellow female employees at
different corporations will be entitled to under the ACA Contraception
Mandate. Invalidating the ACA Contraception Mandate places a burden
upon the natural person, as opposed to the abstract corporate person.
In Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Burwell the plaintiffs interfered with
employees’ statutory right to contraception healthcare insurance. The RFRA
acknowledges that this kind of litigation usually has the end result of shifting
the burden from one group to another. The problem is never totally resolved.
Here, the burden is shifted to the employees, but it seems likely that Title VII
provides the employees with a possible recourse to recover their lost and
oppressed rights.
V. RESOLUTION AND POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE
The Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Burwell cases present a conflict
between the religious rights of the corporation and the employment rights of
natural persons. The most direct way to resolve this issue is for the Court to
rule that corporations have religious rights that are protected under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. This ruling would provide a
legitimate basis for oppressing the Title VII rights of natural persons. Both
employees and employers would then know the full scope of their rights
under the ACA Contraception Mandate because both parties would have
religious rights protected under the Free Exercise Clause. The current

195. Cultural Perspectives on Vaccination, HISTORY VACCINES (Jan. 16,
http://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/articles/cultural-perspectives-vaccination.

2014),
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religious rights of a corporation, assuming it is deemed a religious
corporation by a court, are merely statutory.
Now that the ACA Contraception Mandate has been invalidated by the
Court, it is imperative that employers who are exempt from providing
contraception disclose to current and prospective employees that the burden
of providing for contraception falls to the employees. Employees will then
be able to make an informed decision as to whether the lack of ACA
Contraception Coverage changes their decision to work for the particular
company.
One possible solution that may protect the rights of all parties is the
creation of a trust designed to provide for the contraception coverage
indirectly.196 The corporations in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Burwell are
genuinely concerned with preserving their religious beliefs because they are
not challenging all of the contraception methods, only the ones that interfere
with a fertilized egg. The solution must have the overall goal of preserving
the religious freedom of the corporation and the employment and moral rights
of the individual. To do this, the HRSA can create a federal ACA trust to
administer the contraception benefits, instead of the company directly.
Companies that want to be exempt from the ACA Contraception Mandate
acknowledge that they want to be exempt for a religious reason. The
company then pays the equivalent amount of money that they would have
paid the employee, or an adjusted yearly average, into a trust. Employees
then file their ACA Contraception Mandate needs directly with the trust,
which pays out the coverage. The remainder of the funds are distributed back
to the companies who paid into the trust, or used to support charities specified
by the paying corporate directors. With this model, the employees get the
needed contraception under the ACA Contraception Mandate through the
trust, and the companies do not directly pay for contraception to which they
are religiously opposed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Burwell cases present a conflict
between the religious rights of the corporate person and the employment and
religious rights of natural persons. The Court likely did not resolve the ACA
Contraception Mandate issue by declaring that corporations have First
Amendment religious rights because of the constitutional avoidance
substantive canon. Burwell was decided under the RFRA. The Court ruled
that the ACA Contraception Mandate substantially burdened a corporate
person’s exercise of religion in a manner that is not the least restrictive means
196. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2782 (ACA regulations provide for a similar compromise, but the employee
is still excluded from the company’s group health plan).
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possible. Therefore, the Court allowed a for-profit corporation, such as
Hobby Lobby, to deny its employees the insurance coverage for
contraception to which the employees are otherwise entitled to under the
ACA Contraception Mandate. The Burwell decision is incorrect because this
ruling infringes upon the “religious beliefs” of natural persons under Title
VII. The Court’s holding oppresses the Title VII religious rights of the
natural person, which arise from constitutional protections, while granting
religious protection to corporate persons, who have not been given religious
constitutional protection by the Court. Invalidating the ACA Contraception
Mandate shifts the burden of providing for contraception to the employees,
which will generate valid Title VII claims against the employer from the
burdened employees.

